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FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF
WARRANTLESS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
INTRODUCTION
One aim of a free society is to protect its citizens from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion. The fourth amendment1 protects the
right of the individual to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
The scope of fourth amendment protection, however, is not defined
easily. As the needs of society change and technology advances, the
judiciary is faced with complicated fourth amendment issues.2 One such
difficult issue is the constitutionality of warrantless aerial surveillance.
The judicial system presently condones the use of warrantless
aerial surveillance, although the United States Supreme Court has
yet to address the issue of whether warrantless aerial surveillance
constitutes a search under the fourth amendment.3 The modern ap-
proach to fourth amendment protection began with the Supreme Court
decision in Katz v. United States.4 Katz changed the standard for fourth
amendment protection from the constitutionally protected areas
concept 5 to a test of what an individual reasonably expects to preserve
as private.' This new standard has posed some interpretation problems
for the courts, but, nevertheless, it is applied frequently to surveillance
cases involving fourth amendment issues.
Courts have been reluctant to consider aerial surveillance as a
search under the fourth amendment due to a misapplication of Katz.7
Moreover, courts justify the denial of fourth amendment protection
to aerial surveillance by invoking the plain view and open fields
1. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated;
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
3. See United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 133 (1981).
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See infra notes 12-18 and accom-
panying text.
5. See infra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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doctrines.' An examination of the modern approach to fourth amend-
mend protection, however, demonstrates that aerial surveillance does
indeed constitute a search and, therefore, requires fourth amendment
restrictions. Once it is established that aerial surveillance is a search,
under the modern approach, courts must strike a balance between
effective law enforcement and one's privacy interests.
This note examines the constitutionality of warrantless aerial
surveillance. Although Katz theoretically should protect the individual's
reasonable privacy expectations,' its frequent misapplication serves
to narrow fourth amendment protection. In addition, judicial reliance
on the plain view and open fields doctrines is an inappropriate justifica-
tion for warrantless aerial surveillance. Finally, a critical examina-
tion of the present approach by the courts to aerial surveillance reveals
the difficult fourth amendment issues involved in the unregulated use
of airplanes as surveillance tools.
THE MODERN APPROACH TO FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION:
THE KATZ PRINCIPLE
In the landmark decision of Katz v. United States, the Supreme
Court held for the first time that fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable search and seizure depended upon the individual's
reasonable reliance on privacy." The Court states that "what a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection; but what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected."" Katz is commonly applied to
surveillance cases because such cases involve what an individual
reasonably expects to preserve as private.2
8. See infra notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
9. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
384 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam]. There is a distinct difference between
the right of privacy and the right to expect privacy from the government. The latter
expectation is often overridden by the need for effective law enforcement.
10. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. Id. at 351-52. According to Katz, if a person justifiably relies on a place,
seemingly any place, as private, and the government intrudes upon that place, a search
has occurred. The search is held presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search
warrant. Id. at 361.
12. Id. at 360. Justice Harlan's concurrence established a more concrete basis
for fourth amendment protection. The two-prong reasonable expectation of privacy
test discussed in the text of this note (see infra notes 29-46 and accompanying text)
clarified the majority's somewhat murky interpretation of what a person "justifiably
relies" on as remaining private. The concurrence emphasized that preserving the right
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In Katz, FBI agents attached a listening device to a public
telephone booth in order to uncover illegal activity. The wiretap device
enabled the federal agents to record Katz' telephone conversations.
Katz was subsequently charged with violating a federal statute pro-
hibiting the transmission of wagering information by telephone. 3 At
the trial, the government introduced into evidence the taped conver-
sations of the telephone calls. 4 The Supreme Court concluded that
Katz' privacy interests were invaded by the government through the
use of the wiretap. The Court determined that Katz had "justifiably
relied"' 5 on the privacy of a public telephone booth. The Court failed,
however, to define what "justifiably relied on" meant or how this test
was to be applied in subsequent fourth amendment cases. Generally,
the Katz principle is defined in terms of an individual's reasonable
privacy interests. However, this principle is not clearly defined by
the courts and, therefore, must be applied with caution to all types
of surveillance cases.
The Supreme Court in Katz did not intend to establish a specific
formula for protection against the invasion of one's privacy. The Court
noted that "the Fourth Amendment protected individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion but its protections
went further, and often had nothing to do with privacy at all."'6
Although Katz is the modern approach to fourth amendment protec-
tion, it should not be given a rigid application as it lacks a definitive
standard. Rather, the Katz principle suggests a case-by-case analysis
which takes into account each individual and his reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.
Before Katz, fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
to be free from governmental intrusion means more than recognizing that the fourth
amendment protects expectations of privacy; it ultimately should protect the right
to have certain privacy expectations. Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation
of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REv. 154, 155-56 (1977).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Id. at 348.
15. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, used the ambiguous phrase
"justifiably relied upon" to describe Katz' privacy interests. See supra note 12.
16. 389 U.S. 347, 350, citing, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965):
The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any
more by having property seized openly than by having it seized privately
and by stealth. ... And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritat-
ed, annoyed and injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a policeman
as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office or home.
Id. at 509, n.4. In other words, an individual's privacy interests are not defined by
a place, but rather a reasonable reliance on what type of privacy he is entitled to-no
matter where he may be.
1983]
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search and seizure was only afforded to certain constitutionally pro-
tected areas. Such areas included one's person, house, papers and
effects." Other areas, such as open fields, 8 were not protected under
the fourth amendment. The concept of "constitutionally protected
areas" was the traditional approach to fourth amendment protection.
As a result of sophisticated surveillance devices, however, the con-
cept became ineffective in providing fourth amendment protection. To
fully understand the Katz principle and its relation to aerial
surveillance, a brief review of the constitutionally protected areas stan-
dard is necessary.
The Constitutionally Protected Areas Standard
In establishing the constitutionally protected areas standard, the
Supreme Court strictly construed the fourth amendment. The Court
refused to extend constitutional protection beyond one's person, house,
papers or effects. In an early surveillance case, 9 the Court held that
wiretapping9 did not constitute a search because no physical inva-
sion or trespass of property occurred. Because the fourth amendment
was construed originally to protect an individual from the physical
invasion of constitutionally protected areas, courts applied fourth
amendment protection only to specific areas without examining what
the individual reasonably sought to preserve as private."
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Originally, under a literal interpretation of the fourth
amendment, constitutionally protected areas consisted only of one's person, home,
documents and belongings. Over the years these areas have expanded to include
automobiles, business offices and hotel rooms; generally, see Amsterdam, supra, note
9 at 357. After Katz, fourth amendment protection was extended to garbage in People
v. Krivada, 5 Cal. 3d 357 (1971) (defendants' reasonable expectation of privacy in their
trash did not end until it was co-mingled with everyone else's garbage) and to public
restrooms with open stalls in People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 844 (1973).
18. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
19. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Federal agents in Olmstead
obtained evidence of a conspiracy to violate the Prohibition Act. Government officers
secretly tapped the telephone lines of the conspirators to gain conclusive evidence
of illegal conduct. The wiretapping was not located in the building where the con-
spirators were gathered; it was conducted in the basement of a nearby office building.
The Supreme Court found that no "trespass" was committed on the property, and,
thus, no search. Id.
20. The majority opinion stated that the language of the fourth amendment
could not be expanded to include telephone wires reaching from Olmstead's house out-
ward to the whole world. The Supreme Court found that "the intervening telephone
wires were not a part of Olmstead's house or office any more than were the highways
along which they were hung." Id. at 465.
21. Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of the
Fourth Amendment, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 971 (1968). Judge Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead
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The concept of "constitutionally protected areas" was founded
on the physical trespass theory. For example, if a home was invaded
by federal agents in search of illegal conduct, the action constituted
a physical trespass of a constitutionally protected area-the home.
Physical trespass was considered an unreasonable search under the
fourth amendment. If federal agents, however, looked for evidence
of criminal enterprise in an open field, their actions would not amount
to a search' because an open field traditionally was not afforded fourth
amendment protection.
The Supreme Court applied the constitutionally protected areas
standard to various methods of surveillance. In one case," the Court
held that a detectaphone, a device used to monitor defendants' in-
criminating conversations, placed against a wall was not a search. The
dissent maintained that the search of a home or office no longer re-
quired physical entry24 because modern technology provided more ef-
fective devices for the invasion of one's privacy.' Accordingly, the
dissent argued that the physical trespass theory no longer provided
adequate fourth amendment protection. Since modern surveillance
devices enabled law enforcement officials to enter protected areas
without a physical trespass a reexamination of the constitutionally
protected areas standard was warranted. Eventually, the physical
trespass theory became an ineffective standard for resolving fourth
amendment issues. In Silverman v. United States,' the Supreme Court
held that the use of a "spike mike" constituted a search. Federal
agents inserted the surveillance device through an adjoining wall to
defendant's premises. The device acted as a microphone when it came
in contact with the heating ducts." The Court held that the govern-
ment's unauthorized physical penetration and encroachment upon
defendant's property violated the fourth amendment, although there
reflected the attitude which prompted the Katz decision: "Clauses guaranteeing to the
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity
of adaptation to a changing world." 277 U.S. at 438.
22. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Government agents found remnants of a bottle of illicit
whiskey on Hester's property. Since open fields were not considered to be protected
by the fourth amendment, there was no physical invasion of a constitutionally pro-
tected area, and thus, no search. The most agents were committing was a "technical
trespass" on the property, which was not protected by the fourth amendment. Id.
23. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
24. Justice Murphy's dissent in Goldman stated that conditions of modern life
warranted an expansion of the fourth amendment if people were to enjoy the full
benefit of privacy provided by the Constitution. Id. at 138.
25. 316 U.S. at 139.
26. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
27. Id.
1983]
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was no actual physical trespass upon Silverman's home-a traditional
constitutionally protected area.28
The erosion of the constitutionally protected areas standard con-
tinued after Silverman. In Katz, the Supreme Court shifted fourth
amendment analysis away from the unwieldy "constitutionally pro-
tected areas" standard toward a review of reasonable privacy expec-
tations. The Court in Katz fashioned a more manageable and contem-
porary principle based on the indiv.idual's reasonable expectation of
privacy.
A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Katz principle holds that what an individual reasonably ex-
pects to keep private, even in a public area, may be afforded fourth
amendment protection. The reasonable expectation of privacy stan-
dard, however, is a threshold question which determines whether or
not a search occurred. If a court finds that a search took place, it
must then balance the competing interests between the police action
and the specific privacy expectations involved. Courts must either
justify the police action or find a violation of the fourth amendment.
Most aerial surveillance cases do not meet the threshold ques-
tion of whether a search occurred. Courts are hesitant to regard aerial
surveillance as a search due to misapplication of the Katz principle.
For example, in United States v. Allen,' the defendant exhibited
definite expectations of privacy by posting "no trespassing" signs and
constructing gates across the main road leading into his ranch.0 Yet
28. 365 U.S. at 510. Justice Douglas concurred in the decision while noting:
An electronic device on the outside wall of a house is a permissible inva-
sion of privacy according to Goldman, while an electronic device that
penetrates the wall, as here, is not. Yet the invasion of privacy is as great
in one case as in the other. The concept of 'an unauthorized physical
penetration into the premises' on which the present decision rests, seems
to me to be beside the point.
Id. at 512. Douglas re-emphasized the majority opinion that fourth amendment protec-
tion should not be based on trespass law or focus on the type of electronic equipment
used.
29. 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 133
(1981). The defendants in Allen were arrested for possession of marijuana; they were
not growing marijuana. Their activities became suspect when fisherman and hunters
complained that defendant has terminated their traditional right-of-way across the Allen
property. Acting on that suspicion, law enforcement officials used a helicopter to survey
the Allen ranch. It is fair to surmise that in surveying Allen's property by air, en-
forcement officials were "searching" for evidence of criminal activity.
30. Id.
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the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to hold that aerial
surveillance of the property constituted a search. The court applied
the Katz principle and found that Allen's expectations of privacy were
unreasonable.
While Allen purported to apply Katz by considering whether the
government intruded upon reasonable privacy expectations, the court
failed to include measures taken by the defendant to secure his
privacy. The court agreed with the defendant insofar as "a person
need not construct an opaque bubble over his or her land in order
to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to activities
carried on there in all circumstances."'" But, because the defendant
was aware of routine Coast Guard flights' over the area, the court
concluded that he could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The rationale that "routine" airflight precludes any reasonable
expectation of privacy illustrates the general judicial approach to aerial
surveillance. Because airplanes are a fact of modern life, it is said,
one cannot have reasonable privacy expectations in open property.
There is a distinct difference, however, between "routine" flights and
aerial surveillance.3 Police officers rarely "stumble" across illegal con-
duct when they are in an airplane. Usually the police officers are
searching for signs of criminal activity.' In Allen, the court noted that
any justification for concentrating surveillance on a specific area,
rather than random investigation to discover criminal enterprise, "is
a contributing factor to the justification for the surveillance."3 There
is no apparent reason why a police officer cannot obtain a search war-
rant based on probable cause prior to the aerial surveillance, if in
fact a justification for the surveillance exists. The Katz principle in-
vokes such fourth amendment protection when unwarranted intrusions
occur upon reasonable privacy expectations.
The Katz principle is undermined by the courts' reasoning that
"routine" airflight negates a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
open property. In Allen, the defendant demonstrated a justifiable ex-
pectation of privacy. There was little else he could have done to secure
his property, save constructing an "opaque bubble" over his land.
31. 633 F.2d at 1289.
32. The court noted that the Coast Guard was well known for seacoast patrol
and surveillance. The Coast Guard traversed the airspace over Allen's property for
several reasons-one of which was law enforcement. Id. at 1290. See infra note 50.
33. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
35. 633 F.2d at 1290.
19831
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Fourth amendment protection should not be denied because one can-
not prevent aerial surveillance of property he seeks to preserve as
private."
When aerial surveillance intrudes upon reasonable privacy ex-
pectations, it constitutes a search. The courts' consistent denial of
fourth amendment protection to aerial surveillance results from the
imprecise standard of review set forth in Katz. A reasonable expecta-
tion of of privacy is not a definitive standard and, thus, its applica-
tion often results in incongruous fourth amendment resolutions.
A more precise method for determining fourth amendment pro-
tection was devised in Justice Harlan's concurrence to Katz. Harlan
suggested a two-fold test that is frequently applied in surveillance
cases. 7 First, an individual must exhibit an actual (subjective) ex-
pectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be one socie-
ty considers reasonable (objective).' Some courts have adopted this
test when resolving fourth amendment issues even though substan-
tial opposition to the two-prong analysis exists.
The subjective/objective approach toward specific privacy ex-
36. See infra note 102.
37. As stated by Berner in Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology, 8 VAL.
U.L. REv. 471, 480 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Berner], Katz suggests the following analysis
in light of Justice Harlan's concurrence:
(1) the "place" or context into which the people intrude;
(2) the nature of the actual intrusion;
(3) the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy from such intrusion;
(4) the reasonableness of such expectation in accordance with the societal
norms.
The reasonableness of the expectation is the major consideration in the majority of
fourth amendment cases after Katz. In Katz, the place at issue was an enclosed public
telephone booth. Katz' expectations that his telephone conversations would remain
private were reasonable by society's standards. The booth was not considered to be
accessible to the public at all times even though it was a public telephone booth. Justice
Harlan noted that the telephone booth was a "temporarily private place whose momen-
tary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion were recognized as reasonable."
389 U.S. at 361.
38. 389 U.S. at 361. Justice Harlan also observed that:
A man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy,
but objects, activities or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view'
of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself
has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open world
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
Id. Justice Harlan cited Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), to support his
theory that conversations in the open were not protected by the fourth amendment.
See infra notes 120-142 and accompanying text. See also infra note 85.
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pectations is criticized because it is said to yield unrealistic results. 9
The two-fold test is problematic with regard to aerial surveillance for
several reasons. First, courts seemingly pay little attention to attempts
made by the individual to maintain privacy."° Even though an in-
dividual makes reasonable efforts to secure his property, thereby
meeting the subjective prong of the test, fourth amendment protec-
tion is consistently defeated by the objective requirement.' Society
objectively regards any expectation of privacy in an open area
unreasonable because airflight is a common occurrence. For example,
if one plants a marijuana field, surrounds it by a forest and posts
"no trespassing" signs on the property, such efforts to maintain
privacy may be reasonable but are of little value if the area is
surveyed by a government airplane.
A second major problem with the two-prong test is that it logical-
ly can be extended to defeat all fourth amendment claims. 2 The burden
of proof is on the individual to show that he manifested actual expec-
tations of privacy by posting warning signs and erecting fences. Courts
must then determine whether the individual demonstrated expecta-
tions that society would find reasonable. If the individual had no sub-
jective expectation of privacy, there could be no intrusion upon that
privacy, and, hence, no illegal search. 3 Similarly, the objective view-
point that airflight is "routine" also precludes fourth amendment pro-
tection. In either case, a strict application of the two-fold test nar-
rows the scope of fourth amendment protection in regard to aerial
surveillance.
39. Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
or, a Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63, 74 (1974). The author noted that
the court's treatment of defendant's privacy expectations in State v. Clarke, 242 So.
2d 791 (Fla. App. 1970), was in fact an "objective approach overall" to what was sup-
posedly also a subjective approach. The court found that police officer's action of moun-
ting a fire escape to peer into defendant's window was not violative of the fourth
amendment because other tenants could use the escape and thus defendant's expecta-
tion of privacy was not reasonable. Id. at 75.
40. Id. at 75.
41. See United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980).
42. Note, supra note 39, at 77.
43. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 384. The author found that an actual expecta-
tion of privacy did not have a place in the Katz decision or in a theory of what the
fourth amendment protects. He stated that:
[It] can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's
claim to fourth amendment protection; if it could, the government could
diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announc-
ing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade
and that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive elec-
tronic surveillance.
1983]
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Third, the most disturbing effect of the two-fold test is that it
allows the government to dictate to society what is reasonable. An
individual's privacy expectations, whether subjectively or objectively
reasonable, are negated by the unwarranted "routine" use of aerial
surveillance. If the government announced in advance that airplanes
will make regular flights over certain areas, reasonable expectations
of privacy are effectively curtailed."
An application of Katz to aerial surveillance cases requires careful
scrutiny in order to preserve an individual's privacy interests." Privacy
is significantly reduced if a specific type of law enforcement activity
goes unregulated. This is clearly inconsistent with the aims of a free
society.46 The more logical approach, when applying Katz, is to main-
tain a balance between the interest of society in effective law enforce-
ment and the right of the individual to be left alone.47 The primary
focus of Katz is not privacy, but the right to be protected against
arbitrary governmental intrusion. 8
Although aerial surveillance involves the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure, courts presently do not recognize
aerial surveillance as a search requiring fourth amendment protec-
tion. A close examination of aerial surveillance, however, and its in-
tricate relationship to Katz, reveals that it does fall within the scope
of fourth amendment protection. Fourth amendment safeguards, such
as a search warrant based on probable cause, should therefore ac-
company the use of airplanes as surveillance devices.
WARRANTLESS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Aerial surveillance is the use of airplanes by law enforcement
44. Note, supra note 39, at 77. In aerial surveillance cases, courts have repeatedly
held that defendants' privacy expectations were unreasonable because flights over open
fields were "routine." This notion contravenes both the Katz principle, that what one
reasonably expects to preserve as private may be constitutionally protected, and the
fourth amendment in general. It also contradicts Amsterdam's belief that the fourth
amendment does not ask what we can expect from government, "rather Katz and the
right against unreasonable search and seizure tells us what we should demand from
government." Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 384. See also supra note 9 and accompany-
ing text.
45. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 403.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Boyd, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United States, a Post-
Scriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468, 470 (1976).
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officials to detect criminal activity. 9 It is distinguished from those
cases where law enforcement officials inadvertently encounter illicit
conduct while traversing legal airspace." Before it can be determined
whether or not aerial surveillance falls within the scope of fourth
amendment protection, it must first be established that surveillance
from an aerial vantage point constitutes a search.
"Search" and Its Application to Surveillance Devices
Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the fourth
amendment. Although the Supreme Court has never given a com-
prehensive definition of the term "search,"5 the words "searches and
seizures" are seen as terms of limitation. A search and a violation
of the fourth amendment are not synonymous. A search can occur
based on probable cause or fall within one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement without violating the fourth amendment. 3 A
search absent those justifications, however, violates the right to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.
49. Aerial surveillance is basically achieved by the use of airplanes and
helicopters. Advanced surveillance devices are attached to these vehicles to afford
even greater aerial observation. See, Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance and Other
Aided Observations: The Shrinking Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 11 CAL. W.L. REV.
505 (1975). For example, hand-held binoculars, mounted on gyro-stabilizers, are used
during daylight hours; hovering at 500 feet a license plate number or the color of
one's tie is easily discerned. Id. at 509.
50. The scope of this note is confined to a discussion of aerial surveillance. Some
courts have resolved aerial surveillance issues on the fact that a policeman in the
air could view the area below just as any citizen could do by flying over one's proper-
ty. See infra note 88-101 and accompanying text. This is an untenable justification
for two reasons: (1) the conduct of private citizens is not the standard by which police
conduct is to be measured. Note, supra note 39, at 81; and (2) in most aerial flights
the law enforcement officials' conduct in viewing the property below was deliberate
and not happenstance. While it is true that some types of surveillance by air are
justified, for example, the Coast Guard, there is an important and obvious difference
between routine observation and the deliberate aerial surveillance of a specific site.
For public policy reasons, the latter situation should not remain unregulated as it
serves to undermine fourth amendment protection.
51. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
2.1 (Ist ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAVEI. The term usually implies a quest
for something; under the fourth amendment, the "looking" is performed by a law en-
forcement official.
52. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 356. The terms have a limited application
because law enforcement activity is not required to be reasonable under the fourth
amendment unless the activity is either a "search" or a "seizure." Id., citing United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15, (1973).
53. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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An examination of one's person, home or property, with an in-
tent to discover evidence of contraband or illegal activity, usually con-
stitutes a "search."" While a search impliedly suggests looking for
hidden objects, it is not a search to observe places or things open
to public view.' The idea of "open view," however, is circumvented
by the use of artificial means to gain visual access to otherwise inac-
cessible areas."0 For this reason, the use of vision-enhancing
surveillance devices may amount to a search under the fourth
amendment.
Aerial surveillance is analogous to those cases where the use
of vision-enhancing surveillance devices were found tW constitute a
search. If a police officer flies over an individual's property, with in-
tent to discover criminal conduct, it is fair to assume he is in search
of illegal activity. The use of airplanes, as vision-enhancing surveillance
devices, should thus be deemed "searches" under the fourth
amendment.
A recognition that vision-enhancing surveillance devices could
amount to a search is based on the fourth amendment right to be
secure from unwarranted governmental intrusion." Presumably, as the
technological capabilities of law enforcement increase, the scope of
fourth amendment protection must likewise expand.' For instance,
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1211 (5th ed. 1979). A "search" to which the
exclusionary rule may apply denotes a quest for or a seeking out of that which of-
fends the law by law enforcement officials. Id. See State v. Woodall, 16 Ohio Misc.
226, 241 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1968); Vargas v. State, Tex. Crim. App., 542 S.W.2d 151,
153 (1976). For more on the exclusionary rule, see infra note 177.
55. People v. Montgomery, 84 Ill. App. 3d 695, 405 N.E.2d 1275 (1980).
56. "Artificial means" is a general term which describes any type of vision-
enhancing device used to gain view that normally could not have been gained other-
wise, that is, through the "naked eye." See United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252
(D. Hawaii 1976). Various other types of highly sophisticated surveillance devices in-
clude high-powered binoculars, telescopic cameras, infra-red telescopes and even satellite
surveillance. See also State v. Stachler, - Hawaii __, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (aerial
surveillance upheld because property was in "open view"). But compare State v. Knight,
- Hawaii __, 621 P.2d 370 (1980) (the use of high-powered binoculars was unconstitu-
tional during warrantless visual surveillance).
57. Id. at 1257. See also, Lorenzana v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.
3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973). In Lorenzana, the court held that a
policeman conducted an unreasonable search by peeking into defendant's window. The
police officer was standing on non-public ground peering through a two-inch gap be-
tween the drawn window shade and the sill. The court found the procedure was too
akin to actions taken by a police state and stated that the actions dangerously intrud-
ed on defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
58. United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (D. Hawaii 1976).
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one court recently held that telescopic surveillance of a home con-
stituted a search59 because the use of vision-enhancing devices intrud-
ed upon the owner's privacy.' A reasonable expectation of privacy
in the home is expressly protected by the fourth amendment."' This
protection is also extended to areas outside the home where reasonable
privacy interests are intruded upon by law enforcement officials.62
The right to expect privacy in the home from intrusive
surveillance devices is clearly within the ambit of fourth amendment
protection. Yet the right to have reasonable privacy expectations is
no longer restricted to one's person, papers, home or effects. 3 Fourth
amendment protection was extended beyond the home to vehicular
movement in United States v. Holmes.6 Because government agents
in Holmes found ordinary visual surveillance ineffective in tracking
down the defendant's whereabouts, the agents attached an electronic
tracking device65 to defendant's van and tracked the vehicle by air.6
The government, in defense, argured that a citizen could not
reasonably expect his movements on public roads to remain private. 7
59. Id. at 1252.
60. In Kim, the government agents employed a telescope to gain visual access
to the inside of defendant's home. The curtains were not drawn and thus the agents
had an unobstructed view of defendant's living room. The court noted that it was
"inconceivable that the government could intrude so far into one's home that agents
could discover what newspaper one was reading and still not be considered to have
engaged in a search." Id. at 1256. The court applied Katz and conclusively determined
that a search had occurred. The court also noted that if the government agents had
probable cause to support the use of telescopic surveillance, they could have applied
for a search warrant. Id. In advocating a search warrant based on probable cause
to authorize the telescopic surveillance, the court stated that "the days and hours
when surveillance would be used must be supported by evidence of criminal activity
that would be obtained by the proposed surveillance." Id. at 1257.
61. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
62. United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1978). See infra note
123 and accompanying text.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See supra note 17.
64. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), affd en bane 537
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
65. Electronic tracking devices are commonly called "bumper beepers" and are
attached to vehicles in order to trace the vehicles' movements on the road. In Holmes,
the tracking device was a beacon which allowed the van to be traced by air.
66. The pilot of the plane was not able to determine the exact location of the
van for two reasons: (1) he feared that flying too low would alert defendant to the
aerial surveillance; and (2) the area was heavily wooded. 521 F.2d at 861. Without
the device, defendant's location would have been much more difficult to determine.
67. Id. at 865. The court noted that although an individual can anticipate visual
surveillance on the road, he can reasonably expect to be "alone" in his car when he
drives. Id. at 866. The court did not make a distinction between the attachment of
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The court, finding that argument weak, held that an individual has
a right to expect that police will not affix tracking devices to his car."
Holmes, in accordance with Katz, recognized the right of the individual
to have reasonable privacy expectations. The decision in Holmes ex-
emplifies a judicial belief that unregulated and unauthorized69 police
conduct should not outweigh the right to have reasonable privacy
expectations.
On the contrary, other courts have gone to unusual lengths to
find that an individual's specific privacy expectations were not in-
fringed. For instance, one court held that the use of trained dogs to
detect the odor of marijuana emanting from a parked vehicle did not
constitute a search."0 The court reasoned that the warrantless detec-
tion of marijuana did not violate the fourth amendment because the
dogs only monitored the public air; they did not engage in a search."
Although Katz was cited, the court did not apply it."2 The court believ-
ed that the adoption of any steadfast version of Katz would require
the abandonment of a useful law enforcement tool.7" Since the dogs
had only "minimally invaded" defendant's property, the invasion was
outweighed by the need to obtain evidence of illegal activity.74 The
a beacon without judicial authorization in the form of a warrant and the attachment
of a telephone tap in Katz. Id. at 865.
68. Id. at 866.
69. The use of surveillance devices, especially aerial surveillance, should be
authorized by a judicial magistrate. This insures that their use will not be abused
by overzealous law enforcement officials. The premise of this note is not based on
the abolishment of intrusive surveillance devices. Rather, this note contends that
surveillance methods which constitute searches should be governed by fourth amend-
ment safeguards.
70. United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976). The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court's decision which had held a search
under the circumstances did occur.
71. Id. at 881. In the hearing for a motion to suppress, evidence was admitted
which revealed that the dogs' sense of smell was eight times as acute as that of a
human being. Id. Other evidence showed that the vehicle, a semi-trailer, was com-
pletely enclosed and its walls were approximately six inches thick. The government
conceded that previous to the use of dogs to detect odor, no probable cause existed
for a warrant to search the vehicle. Id.
72. The court also recognized the viewpoint that the use of any aid which
enhances or replaced an officer's natural senses is a search and should be equated
with an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Id. at 882. Yet the court declined to apply
this "hard and fast" rule and held the use of trained dogs to detect narcotics was
not an unreasonable action. Id.
73. Id. Even though the court did not apply Katz, it found that the dogs' intru-
sion into airspace open to the public was reasonably tolerable in today's society. Id.
74. Id. See also United States v. McMillon, 350 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1972). In
McMillon, the premises were enclosed by a six-foot-high stake fence overgrown with
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balancing approach, implemented by the court, served to contravene
the Katz principle by emphasizing the need for useful law enforce-
ment tools rather than reasonable privacy interests.
Aerial surveillance is a decidely useful law enforcement tool. The
government's interest in deterring criminal conduct by employing
aerial surveillance is justifiable. Nevertheless, the unwarranted use
of aerial surveillance intrudes upon reasonable expectations of privacy.
It passes the Katz threshold question of what constitutes a search,75
and consequently violates the fourth amendment.
The judiciary's reluctance to regard aerial surveillance as a search
is understandable because it is a relatively new fourth amendment
issue. Moreover, courts encounter difficulty when applying Katz to
aerial surveillance. An examination of the Katz principle with regard
to other types of surveillance devices helps to clarify what the term
"search" means under the fourth amendment. This, in turn, leads to
a better understanding of why warrantless aerial surveillance should
be considered unconstitutional.
"Bumper Beepers" and Pen Registers: Legitimate Government
Surveillance Devices
Electronic tracking devices, commonly referred to as "bumper
beepers,"7 and pen registers" are modern surveillance tools used to
vines and bushes. Police officers, with the permission of the owner, climbed an adja-
cent porch to observe defendant's yard and consequently viewed marijuana plants grow-
ing on his property. The court held the action did not constitute a search despite
the fact that the police officers had to stand on their toes to get a "plain view" of
defendant's premises. The decision was justified by the judicial finding that the police
officer observed what "would have been visible to any curious passerby." Id. at 594.
Even though the physical condition of defendant's property demonstrated that the
defendant has a constitutionally-protected reasonable expectation of privacy, in accor-
dance with Katz, the police officers' observation was not unreasonable. Id. at 595. A
common sense approach toward defining what constitutes a search is the most effec-
tive way to constitutionally protect that which an individual reasonably expects to
preserve as private. As Amsterdam points out, in cases where "the policeman shines
his flashlight in a parked car or listens at the tenement door, what else is he doing
than searching? When he climbs up a telephone pole and peers beneath a second-story
window shade, what on earth is he doing up that pole but searching?" Amsterdam,
supra note 9, at 384. Similarly, when a police officer repeatedly flies in a plane over
open property, using binoculars to get a closer view, what is he doing in that plane
but searching?
75. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
77. As described in United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich.
1966):
A pen register is a device attached to a telephone line usually at a cen-
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trace criminal activity. Both devices enhance the discovery of criminal
enterprise and are analogous to aerial surveillance. An individual has
a right to expect that his privacy interests are not abolished by the
use of airplanes. When courts determine the constitutionality of
"bumper beepers" and pen registers, privacy interests also are taken
into account.
"Bumper beepers" are electronic devices used to trace vehicular
movement. Generally, these devices are not considered to violate the
fourth amendment because their use has been held as not constituting
a search. 8 Rather, "bumper beepers" are seen as sense-enhancing
devices which do not intrude upon privacy interests. Nevertheless,
in Holmes,9 the court held that the electronic tracking device attach-
ed to defendant's van intruded upon his reasonable expectation of
privacy. The electronic tracking device was thus held to constitute
a search under the fourth amendment.
In Holmes the court implied that an individual does not give up
all expectations of privacy when in public.0 Similar to the Holmes ap-
proach, the District Court of Massachusetts" observed that even
though a person who drives his car could anticipate being followed
by someone, he does not expect that his whereabouts will be con-
tinuously monitored by a tracking device. 2 These decisions recognize
tral office. When a number is dialed, a pulsation of the dial triggers the
attached pen register, which in turn records on a paper tape dashes equal
in number to the number dialed. The paper tape then becomes a perma-
nent record of the outgoing numbers called on that respective line. With
reference to incoming calls, the pen register records only a dash for each
ring of the telephone, but does not identify the numbers from which the
incoming call originated. The pen register ceases to function after the
number is dialed on outgoing calls and after the ringing is concluded on
incoming calls without determining whether the call is completed or the
receiver is answered. There is neither recording nor monitoring of the
conversation. The device is usually used in a legal manner to check for
defective dials or overbilling; it may, however, also be used by criminal
investigators.
Hodge v. Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 255 (9th Cir. 1977).
78. Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE
L.J. 1461 (1977).
79. 521 F.2d 859 (1975).
80. This notion re-echoes the holding in Katz that "what a person seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." 389 U.S. at 351-52. See infra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
81. United States v. Bobinsik, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976), vacated and
remanded, United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977) (remanded on other
grounds).
82. 415 F. Supp. at 1336. On appeal, the court stated, "while a driver has no
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that privacy interests may also be protected in areas accessible to
the public.
The unrestrained use of "bumper beepers" monitors public acts
and intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations. The employment
of those devices by law enforcement officials, therefore, should be
characterized as a search under Katz.' The same reasoning is ap-
plicable to aerial surveillance. Although airspace above the ground
may be regarded as a public thoroughfare," that does not mean all
privacy interests in one's open property are abolished. Furthermore,
if an individual manifests intentions to keep his property private, those
expectations should not be summarily dismissed solely by the objective
viewpoint that airplanes routinely fly over land. Rather, in accordance
with the Katz principle, both the subjective and a reasonable objec-
tive approach must be taken with regard to aerial surveillance." The
judicial approach in Holmes should therefore be applied to aerial
surveillance because both types of monitoring intrude upon reasonable
privacy expectations.
Efforts have been made, however, to uphold the unregulated use
of "bumper beepers" in some circumstances. One court found that the
installation of a tracking device into lawfully-seized contraband, before
claim to be free from observation while driving in public, he properly can expect not
to be carrying around a device that continuously signals his presence." 562 F.2d at
112. Such an intrusion cannot be written off as non-existent. Id.
83. W. LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 423. See also supra note 50 and accompanying
text. The danger of unrestrained use of "bumper beepers" without judicial authoriza-
tion is self-evident. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), was an early ad-
monishment of governmental intrusions without judicial supervision:
It may be that it is the most obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight devia-
tions from legal procedures.
Id.
84. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
85. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), Justice Harlan dissented
to the majority opinion. He examined formulations based on the subjective/objective
approach and stated:
While these formulations represent an advance over the unsophisticated
trespass analysis of the common law, they too have their limitations and
can, ultimately, lead to the substitution of words for analysis. The analysis
must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or
legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks
we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules
the customs and values of the past and present.
Since it is the risk of the law to form and project, as well as mirror
and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and
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defendants purchased it, was not a search. 8 Since the monitoring
device only augmented surveillance, which could have been accomplish-
ed through visual surveillance alone,87 the court held that no intru-
sion upon defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy occurred. No
distinction was made between ordinary visual surveillance and the
use of the electronic tracking device, provided that no fourth amend-
ment violation occurred when the beeper was initially attached.8
Although the rationale that certain monitoring devices only aug-
ment ordinary visual surveillance may arguably apply to "bumper
beepers," it is an untenable justification with regard to warrantless
aerial surveillance. A distinction must be made between ordinary
visual surveillance and aerial surveillance. Law enforcement officials,
absent the ability to fly on their own, could not accomplish through
ordinary visual surveillance what they could achieve by aerial
surveillance.' Therefore, aerial surveillance cannot be likened to those
cases which hold that electronic tracking devices merely enhance or
augment normal visual surveillance2
The pen register is a second type of surveillance device employed
risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.
The critical question, therefore, is whether under our system of govern-
ment, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our citizens
the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at least the pro-
tection of a warrant requirement.
A comparable query would ask whether the government may impose warrantless aerial
surveillance on society, after finding that society deems any expectation of privacy
objectively unreasonable because of routine airflight. Justice Harlan also noted that
"the Fourth Amendment does, of course, leave room for the employment of modern
technology in criminal law enforcement, but in the stream of current developments
in Fourth Amendment law I think it must be held that third-party electronic monitor-
ing, subject only to the self-restraint of law enforcement officials, has no place in our
society." Id. at 790. A similar argument could be made with regard to aerial surveillance.
86. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976); see also United States
v. French, 414 F. Supp 800 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
87. 539 F.2d at 34. See also United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1976). The court in Pretzinger, under similar facts to Hufford, ruled that under the
law of the Ninth Circuit, attachment of an electronic location device to a vehicle mov-
ing about on public thoroughfares, or through public airspace, does not infringe upon
any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore does not constitute a search. 542
F.2d at 520.
88. 539 F.2d at 34.
89. It has been suggested that one should remember Superman is also a law
enforcement official. See generally supra note 37.
90. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Again, the distinction must be
made between aerial surveillance and the use of airplanes for other purposes. For
instance, where airplanes are used to cross long stretches of property, like a 2,000
acre ranch, surveillance from an aerial vantage point is not the purpose for the airflight.
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by law enforcement officials." The use of pen registers involves privacy
interests similar to those found in aerial surveillance and electronic
tracking device cases. The pen register differs from an electronic track-
ing device in that it traces lines of communication rather than
vehicular movement. It can record telephone calls by tracing the
number dialed and the location where the call was made.9 2 Generally,
the courts have not considered the use of pen registers to be violative
of the fourth amendment. Rather, the fourth amendment protects only
the content of a telephone call;93 not that a particular call was made
or that a particular number was dialed. 4 Telephone customers
presumably have no reasonable expectation that records of their calls
will not be made. 5
A recent Supreme Court case supported the notion that telephone
customers do not have reasonable privacy interests in records of their
telephone calls." The pen register in Smith v. Maryland was installed
by the telephone company upon police request,' although no warrant
was issued. The Court deemed that fourth amendment protection
depended upon the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. It
was determined, however, that privacy interests in dialed telephone
numbers did not constitute an expectation that society would recognize
as reasonable.
91. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
92. United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975). In Clegg, the govern-
ment's interest in tracing defendant's calls stemmed from the consistent use of illegal
"blue boxes": an electronic device used to circumvent the telephone company's billing
system. The telephone company, by reporting to the government the information gleaned
from the pen registers, was protecting its own property interests while aiding the
FBI in its nation-wide investigation.
93. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
18 U.S.C.A. S 2510 (5) (1968), which prohibited wiretapping and electronic surveillance,
with some narrowly-defined exceptions. W. LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 277. Congress
passed the Act one year after the Katz decision. The Act does not apply to electronic
tracking devices or to aerial surveillance.
94. 509 F.2d at 610.
95. Id.
96. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
97. Id. at 735.
98. Id. The Court reasoned that when petitioner used the phone he voluntarily
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and therby exposed himself
to the risk that the company would reveal to the police the numbers he had dialed.
Id. at 744. Justice Stewart, Brennan and Marshall disagreed with the majority opinion.
The three concluded that the use of the pen register was an unreasonable intrusion
under the fourth amendment. Id. at 747. The dissent echoed the recurring principle
that fourth amendment protection should not be based on what an individual can
reasonably expect from the government and law enforcement agencies; rather, it is
what an individual has a right to expect. Justice Marshall concluded that privacy was
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The underlying rationale for the use of pen registers is that
telephone customers run the risk of having their numbers recorded
whenever they use the telephone. Risk analysis, however, is a poor
justification for intruding upon specific privacy interests. Even though
"ordinary social intercourse"" poses everyday risks to the individual,
that does not mean the government is constitutionally unrestrained
in benefiting from those risks.1" To permit the government to dictate
what privacy interests are subject to risk and therefore unreasonable
vitiates the individual's right to be free from governmental intrusion.
Freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion is inherent
in the issue of aerial surveillance. Various surveillance devices, in-
cluding electronic tracking devices and pen registers, have been held
constitutional despite their intrusion upon reasonable privacy expec-
tations. As in Holmes, one has a right to expect that government
agents would not affix electronic tracking devices to a car and, as
the dissent in the pen register case stated, one has a right to expect
that records of telephone calls and numbers would not be released
to other persons. In the case of aerial surveillance, one has a right
to expect some degree of privacy if his expectations are reasonably
manifested, despite the common occurrence of airflight over open prop-
erty. Under the courts' present treatment of warrantless aerial
surveillance, however, one's manifested privacy expectations, while
clearly displayed, are consistently defeated.
Aerial surveillance has a definite search quality despite judicial
reluctance to define it as such. Although the Katz principle does not
guarantee an absolute right to privacy, its objective is to provide ade-
not a discreet commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Id. at 749. He stated:
"Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or telephone company for a limited business
purpose need not assume that the information will be released to other persons for
other purposes." Id. Fourth amendment rights should not be determined by what risk
the telephone customer undertook by using the telephone. Marshall opined that to
make risk analysis dispositive in determining the reasonableness of privacy expecta-
tions would permit the government to define the boundaries of the fourth amendment.
Id. at 750.
99. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 406. Amsterdam also observed:
Every person who parks his or her car on a side street in Greenwich
Village voluntarily runs the risk that it will be burglarized-a risk, I should
add as one who has lived in Greenwich Village, that is very much higher
than the risk of betrayal by your friends even if you happen to choose
a circle of machiavellian monsters. Does that mean that government agents
can break into your parked car uncontrolled by the Fourth Amendment?
100. Id.
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quate fourth amendment protection. The misapplication of Katz,
through the invocation of the plain view and open fields doctrines,
further emphasizes the need to regard aerial surveillance as a search
requiring fourth amendment protection.
The Plain View and Open Fields Doctrines: Improper Justifications
for the Use of Warrantless Aerial Surveillance
Many courts consistently deny fourth amendment protection to
aerial surveillance by applying the plain view and open fields doc-
trines. The plain view rationale is that a law enforcement official, in
legal airspace, is in a place where he has a right to be °'0 and anything
the officer sees from that vantage point is in "plain view"°2 - exposed
to the public. In addition, it is argued that warrantless aerial
surveillance of property is constitutional because open fields are not
afforded fourth amendment protection. The plain view doctrine, when
applied to aerial surveillance, abrogates the Katz principle which holds
that what an individual reasonably expects to preserve as private,
even though in a public place, may be constitutionally protected."3
Moreover, although Katz did not expressly overrule United States v.
Hester,"" which held that open fields were not constitutionally pro-
tected areas, the concept of constitutionally protected areas was
replaced impliedly by Katz and other subsequent decisions. The
modern approach to fourth amendment protection thus remains largely
dependent upon one's reasonable privacy expectations.
A recent aerial surveillance case appropriately raised the issues
of whether the plain view doctrine justifies warrantless aerial
surveillance and whether the open fields doctrine remains viable.'0 5
The court upheld the use of warrantless aerial surveillance by law
enforcement officials who surveyed defendant's property by air. In
support of its decision, the court observed that is was "no more
unreasonable to expect an airplane to fly over a farm at a legal
distance than to expect a passer-by, whether a policeman or not, to
look past the strand of barbwire separating an open field from a
101. People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1979).
102. Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance, 15 ARiZ. L. REV. 145 (1973). Plain
view will always be controlling in aerial surveillance cases unless the precautions taken
by the individual to preserve his expectations of privacy are observed. Id.
103. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
104. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
105. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923 (1981), cert. denied, __
U.S. .. 102 S. Ct. 109 (1981). See also State v. Stachler, 570 P.2d 1323 (Hawaii 1977)
(contraband growing on side of ridge was susceptible to warrantless aerial surveillance).
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highway."'' 6 In what was presumably an effort to convict the defend-
ants for growing marijuana, the court invoked both the plain view
and open fields doctrines to justify the warrantless aerial surveillance.
These doctrines, however, are inapposite when applied to the
unregulated use of airplanes as surveillance devices.
The plain view doctrine cannot be applied to any fourth amend-
ment issue until its stated requirements are met.0 7 It is important
to fulfill these requirements because the plain view doctrine validates
the warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence. The requirements
for plain view are as follows: (1) there must be a valid prior intrusion
by a law enforcement official which is justified by either a search
warrant or one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement; (2) the
discovery of the seized items must be inadvertent; and (3) the law
enforcement officials must have immediately recognized the evidence. 8
A typical example of plain view is where a police officer enters a
suspect's home with a search warrant, looking for a murder weapon,
and observes contraband lying in "plain view" on a table. The police
officer is allowed to seize the contraband under the plain view doc-
trine. The rationale for the plain view doctrine is that the police of-
ficer has a right to be where he is and may seize the evidence as
a result of that right.'019
Application of the plain view doctrine to aerial surveillance is
problematic because the standard for plain view is whether "a police
officer, using only natural vision in a natural or normal position from
a normally public place, can observe the objects or activities which
the individual expects to keep private.""' Although a police officer
106. 277 S.E.2d at 925. The court noted that the sky, like the road, is a highway
over which those licensed to do so may pass, so long as they keep a proper vertical
distance between their craft and the property of others. Id. at 925. Yet by keeping
a proper distance, binoculars or other visual aids are needed to uncover criminal ac-
tivity. Furthermore, the Williams decision equates what a curious passerby might do
with that or what a law enforcement official could do.
107. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, defendant was
convicted for the murder of a young girl based on evidence seized without a warrant:
the conviction was reversed and remanded.
108. Id. at 443. The court in Coolidge overturned defendant's conviction because
the circumstances of the case did not meet the requirements for plain view. In Coolidge,
the discovery was not inadvertent. Furthermore, the police had ample opportunity
to obtain a search warrant to seize defendant's car. Id.
109. The Supreme Court's most recent statement on plain view permits police
officers to search containers found in automobiles, even if the containers are not opaque,
as long as the evidence searched for could fit within such a container. In other words,
an officer "cannot look for an alien inside a suitcase." United States v. Ross, 50, U.S.L.W.
4580 (U.S. June 1, 1982).
110. Comment, supra note 49, at 534.
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in an airplane arguably may be in a place where he has a right to
be, he is using a vision-enhancing device to survey the property
below.' The officer is elevated to a height from which he has a distinct
vantage point; his observations therefore are not inadvertent. The
plain view doctrine revolves around the inadvertent discovery of
evidence based on a prior valid intrusion. Courts have applied the
plain view doctrine to aerial surveillance cases even though the doc-
trine's stated requirements have not been fulfilled. Additionally, courts
have frequently misapplied the plain view doctrine to justify a find-
ing that no search was committed.
Another inherent problem with the plain view doctrine and aerial
surveillance is the concept of a prior valid intrusion. The plain view
doctrine is not an absolute statement of a law enforcement official's
right to seize evidence after viewing something in open view; it is
a specific and limited right following a valid intrusion."2 The concept
that there is no intrusion into open fields"3 is a valid one with regard
to the plain view doctrine. The policeman's right to seize items in
plain view, after making a prior valid intrusion, cannot be likened
to a police officer flying over open property because, in the latter
circumstance, no prior valid intrusion has occurred. The idea of a prior
valid intrusion is inapplicable to aerial surveillance cases because one
cannot intrude upon areas that are open."'
1H1: Flying at a legal height, most police officers require the aid of binoculars
to obtain a clear view of the area being surveyed.
112. Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search
Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1096 (1975). The court in Coolidge
noted:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them has a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused.
402 U.S. at 466.
[Ilt is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any
evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the mo-
ment of seizure. The problem with the "plain view" doctrine has been
to identify the circumstances in which plain view has legal significance
rather than being the normal concomitant of any search, legal or illegal.
403 U.S. at 465.
113. Id.
114. Berner, supra note 37, at 492-93. Berner examines the plain view doctrine
and states:
Casual observation by police in a public place has often been upheld under
the "plain view" doctrine. There certainly is no need for a "doctrine" to
explain the validity of such activity. "Plain view" traditionally has arisen
when the officer has already entered a protected area. Such cases then
turn on the validity of the officers' presence in such place. If an officer
sees contraband in "plain view" on a bedroom nightstand, the validity
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Aerial surveillance cannot be considered a plain view concern
because the requirements of a prior valid intrusion and inadvertent
discovery are missing. The notion that a police officer flying at a legal
height is in a place where he has the right to be, is inconsistent with
the concept of a prior valid intrusion because one cannot intrude upon
a place where one has the right to be. Moreover, a police officer's
use of an airplane to survey property is hardly an inadvertent observa-
tion. The plain view doctrine is, therefore, an improper justification
for the use of warrantless aerial surveillance.
The plain view doctrine is also incompatible, in regard to aerial
surveillance, with the Katz principle that what an individual reasonably
expects to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.1 5 Law enforcement officials cannot
justify aerial surveillance by claiming that what they observed was
in plain view, without regard for what an individual did to preserve
his privacy. An individual who makes an effort to shield his property
from others should not be penalized because he is incapable of prevent-
ing aerial observation... "Plane view," as one author noted, is not
plain view.17
Despite the enumerated problems posed by the application of
the plain view doctrine to aerial surveillance, courts continue to employ
it as a justification for the unregulated use of airplanes as surveillance
tools. Courts do not find that a search was committed because of the
plain view character of the situation, and, therefore, hold that aerial
observation is lawful without the requirements of pre-existing prob-
of such discovery depends primarily on the validity of his presence in
the bedroom. If the entry were unlawful, the fruits of such entry are
excluded. When a policeman opens a dresser drawer, the contents may
be said to be in "plain view," and yet this is hardly of the same mold
as observing the color or license number of an automobile on the street.
Since the "plain view" doctrine does nothing more than affirm that the
use of fruits of a search depend on its validity, it has no applicability
in a setting where no search is being conducted. In short, if a policeman
sees something in "plain view" in a public area, he has no need for the
"plain view" doctrine.
Id.
115. In United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1365, n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the
dissent held that "if Katz is still the law, and everyone concedes it is, it is difficult
to understand how the plain view doctrine [on which the majority in Wright relied]
can be taken seriously, particularly as a justification for invading premises in non-
exigent circumstances without a warrant."
116. Comment, supra note 102, at 167.
117. Granberg, Is Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Constitutional? 55 CAL. ST. B.J.
451 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Granberg].
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able cause, a search warrant or one of the traditional exceptions to
the warrant requirement."' The plain view doctrine, when applied by
the courts to aerial surveillance, eliminates one's right against un-
warranted governmental intrusion and nullifies fourth amendment
protection."9
The open field doctrine is another justification employed by the
courts to uphold warrantless aerial surveillance, In light of Katz, the
application of the open fields doctrine is questionable. By emphasiz-
ing privacy interests instead of protected areas, Katz implicity replaced
the outmoded concept that fourth amendment protection does not ex-
tend to open fields. It is therefore necessary to examine the open
fields justification for warrantless aerial surveillance because such
surveillance is commonly directed towards open property.
In 1924, the Supreme Court ruled that open fields were not pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. 2 ' The Court stated in Hester v.
United States,2' that the distinction between a house, which was a
protected area under the fourth amendment, and open fields, which
were unprotected, was as old as the common law." Subsequent to
the Hester decision, fourth amendment protection was extended to
the curtilage,'23 the immediate area surrounding a home. To date,
however, fourth amendment protection has not been interpreted con-
sistently to include open fields.
118. W. LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 263. Consent searches, a limited class of routine-
type searches and certain searches conducted under exigent circumstances, are excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 358. See also United
States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976). In Frazier, obtaining a search war-
rant would have impeded immediate police action. The defendant was involved in an
extortion plan which included attaching a belt of dynamite around the victim. Such
exigent circumstances are rare, and hardly ever arise in the case of aerial surveillance.
For a complete discussion of exigent circumstances, see Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968).
119. Note, supra note 12, at 157. There are no "adequate safeguards which pro-
tect the public from police who use visual aid techniques to transform America into
a 'watched society' if courts apply the physical presence test of plain view." Com-
ment, supra note 49, at 510.
120. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
121. Id. at 59.
122. Id. The word "open" in the Hester rule has not been strictly used; the rule
has applied when the land was fenced in, posted with "no trespassing" signs and when
the evidence was not in plain view. The term "fields" enjoys similar expansion and
has been applied to police intrusions into wooded areas, open beaches, desert, vacant
lots in urban areas and open waters. W. LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 332.
123. The court in United States v. Williams, 581 F2.d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1978),
noted that the distinction between open fields and curtilage, after Katz, is only helpful
in determining whether or not an individual's expectation of privacy is reasonable.
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The viability of the open fields doctrine is debatable. As noted,"'
the constitutionally protected areas concept did not provide adequate
fourth amendment protection. Technological advances in surveillance
devices and law enforcement capabilities rendered the concept in-
operative in protecting one from unreasonable search and seizure.
Some courts have recognized that the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy standard2 ' modified the open fields doctrine, but a substan-
tial number of courts' have continued to employ a straight-forward
application of Hester."'
The court also suggested three possible ways of defining curtilage: (1) drawing the
line an arbitrary distance from the most remote outbuilding in the curtilage; (2) holding
that the curtilage includes a "reasonable zone" beyond the most remote outbuilding
in the curtilage; (3) or holding that the outer walls of the extreme outbuildings of
the curtilage define the outer limits of the curtilage. Id. at 454. The Williams court
adopted the last definition, finding the first definition irrational and the second vague. Id.
124. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
126. Generally, see United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, __ U.S. - 101 S. Ct. 1710 (1981) (defendant had no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in a junked vehicle placed in an open field); Patler v. Slayton, 503
F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974) (defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in respect
to bullets and shell casings seized from pastureland); United States v. Noe, 494 F.
Supp. 1032 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (defendant had no expectation of privacy when storing two
bales of marijuana in an open field without any attempt to hide them from public
view); United States v. Swann, 377 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1974) (game wardens' search
for attempted taking of migratory waterfowl with aid of bait valid under the "open
fields" doctrine). See also Morsman v. State, 360 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1978), where the court
found that the area adjacent to defendant's backyard was "clothed with a reasonable
expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Also Keely v. State,
146 Ga. App. 179, 245 S.E.2d 872 (1978), where defendants, as tent dwellers, had a
reasonable expectation of privacy against unreasonable government intrusions under
the fourth amendment.
127. W. LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 333. Hester dealt with defendant's prosecution
for concealing moonshine whiskey. Revenue officers found the whiskey in a broken
jug near defendant's house. Justice Holmes authored the brief opinion by stating the
protection accorded to the people in their "persons, houses, papers and effects" does
not extend to open fields. 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). A strict application of Hester could
have disturbing results. For example, in Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d
252 (1974), the sheriff, acting on suspicion of foul play, dug up defendant's property
in search of the body of defendant's wife. The body of defendant's wife was found
buried in the ground beneath a pile of rocks. The court held that Hester remained
authoritative even though defendant arguably had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in burying his wife underneath a rockpile. The court reasoned that if the field, pur-
suant to Hester, was not afforded constitutional protection, the sheriff's act of digging
into the ground to find the body was a trespass only and did not involve the Fourth
Amendment protection. Although a majority of the court felt an "outrageous trespass"
occurred when the sheriff dug up the body, it declined to consider the act a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Conceivably, the sheriff might dig up
every farm yard in the county for his quest without constitutional restraint. W.
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A strict application of Hester to all open fields undermines the
Katz principle. The Hester approach arbitrarily declares that land
beyond the curtilage is subject to police scrutiny and intrusion; no
matter how careful the occupant is to keep the property private.'28
A reasonable expectation of privacy, expressed by attempts to keep
land private, is impossible under a straight Hester approach. The more
logical approach would be that "open fields" no longer has any in-
dependent meaning, but instead only indicates that open fields are
not areas traditionally protected by the fourth amendment.'29
This approach to open fields was recently applied by several
courts. A portion of defendant's farm land in United States v. Oliver a0
was leased out to a third party. Investigating officers, who paid no
attention to the locked gate and "no trespassing" signs, discovered
marijuana growing on the leased land. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the concept of constitutionally protected areas
was replaced impliedly by Katz. The court ruled that Katz, in effect,
modified Hester to the point where open fields could be afforded con-
stitutional protection.''
Katz effectively shifted the test for the fourth amendment pro-
tection from an inquiry into common law property distinctions, name-
ly constitutionally protected area, to an inquiry into an individual's
reasonable expectations of privacy.'32 In Oliver, the court stated that
LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 337. The dissent to Conrad found the search unreasonable in
that the location of the rockpile on defendant's farm was not an open field within
the meaning of the doctrine. Id. at 357. It is unacceptable to suppose that a sheriff
on suspicion can dig up one's property with a backhoe or a bulldozer, looking for
evidence of a crime. Id. Compare, United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 489 F.2d
865 (2d Cir. 1973): Bensinger, similar to Conrad, dealt with a search for evidence in
an open field. The case involved the murder of a teen-aged girl who was a "friend"
to both father and son. The father confessed the murder to his son. The body was
found on the father's farm in Indiana, after the son had told police the specific place
where the father had admitted burying it. 489 F.2d at 869. The court cited Hester
in support of the search conducted in an area outside of the curtilage.
128. W. LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 336.
129. United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976). The court in United
States v. Basile, 569 F.2d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 1978), held that under both Katz and
Freie fourth amendment inquiry does not relate to the geography of open fields, but
relates to the state of mind of the person asserting the fourth amendment claim, and
the reasonableness of that person's expectation of privacy in respect to the area of
the thing searched. 569 F.2d at 1058.
130. United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1981). The appellant was charg-
ed with manufacturing marijuana. The government argued that the evidence was ad-
missible on the grounds that it was a warrantless search of an open field.
131. Id. at 87.
132. Id.
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fourth amendment protection was no longer a question of whether
the search was conducted in a "constitutionally protected area,"'" but,
rather, whether the individual's expectations of privacy in the area
searched were reasonable. The defendant in Oliver had demonstrated
both a subjective expectation of privacy in the posting of fences and
"no trespassing" signs, and a reasonable objective expectation of
privacy. '34 The court held that society's interest in effective law en-
forcement was not hampered by the requirement of a search warrant
prior to a search of a private field, absent exigent circumstances.135
A second case favoring a reasonable expectation of privacy in
an open field was United States v. Berkshire Beagle Club." In Berkshire,
a natural resource officer (NRO), suspecting the possible trapping of
protected wildlife, entered the club's premises without a search war-
rant through an unlocked gate, '37 and seized leg traps. The court held
that the officer exceeded his statutory authority by proceeding without
judicial authorization. The Berkshire decision was based on Katz and
the fact that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by the judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the fourth amendment-subject only to a few well-delineated
exceptions."'38 In Berkshire, the court found that Hester neither
specifically nor the "open fields" doctrine generally, were cited among
those few exceptions.1 39 The defendants in Berkshire also fulfilled the
133. Id., citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967).
134. 657 F.2d 85. See also State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1981); State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. 1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
135. 657 F.2d 85. The court cited several cases which supported its belief that
the "open fields" exception to the fourth amendment can no longer be automatically
invoked to validate a warrantless search. These cases included: United States v.
Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Berkshire Beagle Club,
No. __ (D. Mass. Aug. 1981); United States v. Debacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081
(W.D. Mich. 1980); Burkholder v. Superior Court. 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr.
86 (1979); State v. Larkin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549 (Tenn. 1979).
136. United States v. Berkshire Beagle Club, No. - (D. Mass. Aug. 1981).
137. The Club's premises were located on a two-hundred acre site, surrounded
by a 11/4 inch wire mesh fence approximately five feet high. The fence was posted
with "no trespassing" signs. Id.
138. 389 U.S. at 357 (1967). See supra note 118 and accompanying text. It is
interesting to note that "a few well-delineated exceptions" amount to approximately
70% of fourth amendment cases. Berner, supra note 37.
139. No. __ (D. Mass. Aug. 1981). The court also noted that the "open fields"
doctrine has "reflected the underlying conceptual uncertainty regarding its relation
to the Fourth Amendment in that truly open fields (no fence) surrounding a house
are not protected by the fourth amendment but yet the curtilage of a dwelling, in-
cluding open areas, is protected." Id. See also United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451
(5th Cir. 1978); Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968) (defendant's
stockpile of illegally cut Christmas trees was within the protected curtilage zone).
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two-pronged Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test by surround-
ing their property with a five-foot high fence and posting "no trespass-
ing" signs. Short of hiring guards, it is hard to see how defendants
could have evinced any clearer intent to exclude outsiders from the
premises. "' Furthermore, the defendants' privacy expectations in
Berkshire were objectively reasonable in that the fenced-in areas
shielded a view by the general public."'
The Oliver and Berkshire decisions indicate a present trend
towards a reconciliation between the open fields doctrine and a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Since Katz cannot be ignored, its
guiding principle must be harmonized with the outdated notion that
open fields are exempt from fourth amendment protection. In both
Oliver and Berkshire, the defendants demonstrated, through their
physical efforts, a desire to keep their property private. Under Katz,
governmental intrusion upon those privacy interests constituted a
search. Fourth amendment protection of the open fields was therefore
required.
The extension of fourth amendment protection to open fields
directly affects the use of warrantless aerial surveillance. Proponents
of unregulated surveillance by air consequently face difficult obstacles
in arguing that aerial surveillance does not constitute a search. If open
fields are no longer considered strictly outside the ambit of fourth
amendment protection,'42 as Oliver and Berkshire suggest, the proposi-
tion that aerial surveillance is a search, requiring fourth amendment
protection, continues to gain strength. For example, if the natural
140. No. __ (D. Mass. Aug. 1981).
141. Id.
142. United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Ky 1980). The final
analysis is that "open fields" are not per se outside the protective boundary of the
fourth amendment, but a defendant's expectations of privacy in an open field must
be an expectation that society would consider reasonable, namely, a reasonably object-
ive expectation. However, in Mullinex, the court held that defendant could not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy because airplane flights over his property were
not unusual, despite defendant's efforts to conceal his marijuana patch from the public
and the remoteness of his farm. Id. See also United States ex rel. Gedko v. Heer, 406
F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Wis. 1973). The court in Gedko found that defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his conversations and activities conducted in his open fields.
Even though defendant's property was fenced in and warning signs were posted, govern-
ment officials intruded into the area and stationed themselves in the woods. From
that vantage point, the officers were able to observe reactions made by the defendant
to a low-flying government plane. The court, in holding that "open fields" no longer
retained any independent meaning, found that the officials' observation of defendant's
reactions (to a plane flying over his marijuana field) constituted a search. The court
concluded that defendant had a "reasonable, exhibited and justifiable" expectation of
privacy; therefore, he was entitled to fourth amendment protection. 406 F. Supp. 609.
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resource officer in Berkshire had hired an airplane to survey the
premises, an intrusion upon defendant's reasonable privacy interests
would still have occurred. Although the officer would not have made
an actual physical entry, as he did on the ground, he still would have
invaded the defendant's privacy interests by an aerial intrusion. Thus,
it can be concluded that intrusions, either from the ground or by air,
into an area one reasonably expects to preserve as private, are
unreasonable under Katz. Such intrusions are "searches" and,
therefore, should follow the warrant requirement established by the
fourth amendment.
Aerial Surveillance Constitutes a Search Under the Fourth Amendment
With the modification of the open fields doctrine, it is apparent
that individuals can have reasonable expectations of privacy in their
open property. As the courts continue to apply Katz to cases involv-
ing open fields, a comparison with aerial surveillance is appropriate.
If an individual attempts to secure his open property from ground
surveillance and his expectations of privacy are deemed reasonable,
any intrusion upon that privacy is unreasonable absent a search war-
rant. The same rationale applies to airplanes and helicopters that in-
trude upon private property above the ground. The Katz principle
states that what an individual reasonably expects to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public,"" may be constitu-
tionally protected.'44 An individual who seeks to shield his property
from public view should not be denied fourth amendment protection
because he is unable to protect his property from aerial observation. 14 5
Aerial surveillance of activity on private property may constitute an
unreasonable search, if the individual has demonstrated reasonable
privacy interests.'46 Therefore, it can be concluded that aerial
143. Some courts have interpreted public areas as a place where an officer has
a legal right to be. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text. The Model Rules
for Law Enforcement, published by the Police Foundation (1974) states:
It is difficult to define precisely those places where an officer has a right
to be. Generally they include: (i) areas of public or private property normal-
ly accessible to the public or its view; (ii) any place with the consent of
a person empowered to give such consent; (iii) any place pursuant to a
court order (such as an arrest or search warrant); (iv) any place where
circumstances dictate immediate police presence to protect life, well-being
or property; or (v) any place to effect a proper warrantless arrest.
144. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
145. Comment, supra note 102, at 167.
146. Id.
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surveillance, absent a search warrant based on probable cause, violates
the fourth amendment.
14 7
Katz expressed the basic constitutional rule defining unreasonable
searches: "searches conducted outside the judicial process without
prior approval by a magistrate are per se unreasonable.""' Aerial
surveillance does not fall into one of the few exceptions to the war-
rant requirement. Rather, it is a sense-enhancing method for survey-
ing from the air what normally cannot be observed from the ground,
and often intrudes upon an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy. Moreover, aerial surveillance is a search that cannot be
justified by the plain view or open fields doctrine."9 If aerial
surveillance is conducted without proper judicial authorization, it con-
stitutes an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment.
The framers of the Constitution included the warrant require-
ment in the fourth amendment to prevent unjustified search and
seizure thereby protecting the individual's right to be free from ar-
bitrary governmental intrusion." Unless one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement is present, aerial surveillance should be govern-
ed by fourth amendment safeguards. Judicial authorization for the use
of airplanes as surveillance tools effectively regulates the ability of
a law enforcement official to investigate purported criminal activity."
Various types of sense-enhancing surveillance tools, including
aerial surveillance, are undoubtedly potent law enforcement aids. Their
regulated use through warrant procedures is therefore justified. 25 In
the case of aerial surveillance, judicial authorization also preserves
the right to have reasonable privacy expectations. If fourth amend-
ment protection is afforded to aerial surveillance, the legitimate
government interest in detecting criminal activity will be more equally
balanced with the right to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion. Katz is more consistently applied to aerial surveillance cases
when courts adhere to the modern approach for resolving fourth
amendment issues. A critical examination of the courts' application
147. Id.
148. 389 U.S. at 357. See supra note 118 and accompanying text; see also supra
note 138 and accompanying text. There are, of course, some "well-delineated excep-
tions" to the unreasonableness of warrantless searches.
149. See supra notes 101-142 and accompanying text.
150. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 841. If aerial surveillance is a serach, it follows
that fourth amendment protection in the form of a search warrant is required.
151. Comment, supra note 49, at 534.
152. Id. at 536. See infra notes 173-178 and accompanying text.
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of Katz to aerial surveillance reveals the inherent difficulties posed
by the use of airplanes as surveillance tools.
AN APPLICATION OF THE KATZ PRINCIPLE TO
WARRANTLESS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
The Katz principle is based on what an individual seeks to main-
tain as private. If an individual demonstrates reasonable intentions
to keep his property private, then, under Katz, he is afforded fourth
amendment protection when those privacy expectations are intruded
upon by law enforcement officials. Nevertheless, the courts' applica-
tion of Katz to aerial surveillance frequently serves to narrow the
scope of fourth amendment protection.53
Fourth amendment protection is limited when courts adopt a
balancing approach toward aerial surveillance. For instance, in a case
similar to Allen," one court held that the minor expectations of
privacy exhibited by defendant did not outweigh the value of society
in permitting warrantless aerial surveillance. 5 A police officer, fly-
ing at an altitude of 50 feet, observed marijuana growing in defend-
ant's open fields.'" The property was located in an isolated area with
fences and "no trespassing" signs posted. While the court advocated
a more sensitive reading of Katz, which would uphold a reasonable
expectation of privacy against warrantless aerial surveillance, the court
nevertheless concluded that isolated instances of aerial surveillance 5 7
over "open fields" did not violate the fourth amendment.'"
153. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (D.C. Mich. 1980). The judge
disagreed that "open fields" are outside the scope of the fourth amendment because
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists. He stated that "such a reading of the
Fourth Amendment would provide police with a 'carte blanche' to investigate areas
outside of a homestead's curtilage." Id. at 1081.
156. Id. at 1078.
157. See People v. Lashmett, 389 N.E.2d 429 (1979. In Lashmett, the surveillance
was not isolated. Acting on a tip, the sheriff chartered an airplane and flew over defend-
ant's property searching for stolen farm machinery. He found the stolen goods only
after viewing them from the air. The land on which the stolen farm machinery was
located was enclosed by both an outer and an inner fence. The equipment could not
be seen from adjacent public ways. Although this type of case was one of first im-
pression for the court, it would not hold the aerial "observation" to be an illegal search.
Id. The court in United States v. DeBacker, observed that when airplanes fly over
farmland, frequently at low altitudes, the defendant could not reasonably expect his
property to remain private. Any pilot could have observed the marijuana field and
notified the police. 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (D.C. Mich. 1980). Yet priavte citizens do
not have police powers and undoubtedly would not be "searching" for criminal activity.
158. 493 F. Supp. at 1078.
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Several recent California decisions involving aerial surveillance
also give a narrow interpretation of the fourth amendment. The decis-
ions are based on the "common agrarian habits of mankind" and repre-
sent a retreat from Katz'" by refusing to properly focus on individual
privacy interests.' 0 In one case, the fourth amendment was found to
guard reasonable privacy expectations from both "aerial and terrestrial
intrusion.'... Aerial surveillance, however, was not considered to be
a search because other agriculturalists did not expect their crops to
be immune from aerial view. Therefore, the defendant could not
reasonably expect his marijuana crop, like a wheat crop, to remain
private."6 2 The open fields doctrine was impliedly invoked to justify
the aerial surveillance. The court held that the defendant could not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, despite the defendant's
cultivation of the marijuana crop in an isolated area which was sur-
rounded by forest. Although the defendant may have had an expecta-
tion of privacy in his mind, the court found he did not objectively
communicate those expectations to society.' 3
The concept that reasonable privacy expectations rest on the com-
mon habits of farmers was again expressed in another California aerial
surveillance case.' The court employed an objective reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test' 5 to hold that attempts to hide contraband
159. Granberg, supra note 117, at 451. The author criticized the recent decisions
as deviating from a proper application of the Katz principle: whether or not an in-
dividual has objectively manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. Further-
more, an application of the "plain view" to aerial surveillance is erroneous because
'absent feathered policemen, such surveillance cannot occur without technological
assistance." Id.
160. Id. at 454.
161. Dean v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 3d 585, 108 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117 (1973).
162. Id. at 589. The court noted that "mankind's common habits in the use of
domestic and business property supply a prime measure for the reasonableness of
expectations of privacy." Id. The court also made the distinction between one who
could reasonably expect privacy in his backyard swimming pool, but found one could
not expect fourth amendment protection in his open fields. In effect, the Dean court
resurrected the outmoded concept of "constitutionally protected areas." See also, Tut-
tle v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 320 (1981) (no reasonable expectation of privacy
in open fields).
163. Id. at 859.
164. People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980). See
also People v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637 (1981) (binocular-aided aerial surveillance
lawful); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979).
In Burkholder, aerial surveillance, with the aid of binoculars, was conducted at 1,500
at 2,000 feet. Police officials sited a large marijuana field located in a heavily wooded
and mountainous region. The area was only observable from the air. 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 891.
165. 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, at 890.
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constituted insufficient privacy expectations."' Instead, an individual
was required to show that "the land in question was expected to re-
main private according to the common habits of persons engaged in
agriculture.' 67 In addition, the police officers were deemed to have
been in a place where they had a right to be and therefore had a
"plain view" of the marijuana corp. Thus, the defendant was not en-
titled to fourth amendment protection because the surveyed land was
not "expected to remain private." ' 8
The California approach, based on agricultural habits, is inconsis-
tent with the Katz principle. The approach does not focus on the in-
dividual's actions to reasonably manifest his privacy interests.
Although Katz incorporates both the subjective and objective stand-
ards for reasonableness, the California approach strikes down fourth
amendment protection for aerial surveillance solely on an objective
level; that is, the "common agricultural habits of mankind." Taken
to its logical extreme, the California approach would extend protec-
tion to an open field only if it was covered by an opaque bubble.
The two California decisions also invoke the inapplicable plain
view doctrine to justify aerial surveillance. Aerial surveillance, never-
theless, is a sense-enhancing means for achieving a distinct visual van-
tage point. As one legal writer noted, "aerial surveillance is no more
'plain view' than a wiretap is 'plain hearing.' "169 The California courts,
like most courts, misapply the Katz principle and the plain view doc-
trine to justify the warrantless aerial surveillance of open property.
A proper application of the two-prong analysis in Katz was im-
plemented in one case where the defendant had placed a stolen car
behind a five-foot fence. 7 ° Because the fence could not shield the car
from public view, the court held a view from a helicopter did not
violate any manifested privacy interest.'"' The defendant's reliance on
a five-foot barrier was held objectively unreasonable and, therefore,
the second prong of the Katz test was not met.
These aerial surveillance cases demonstrate that the balance be-
tween the need for effective law enforcement and the protection of
one's reasonable privacy expectations is not easily struck. The courts,
aware of the need to deter criminal activity, hesitate to find warrant-
166. Id.
167. Id. at 891.
168. Id.
169. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
170. People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1973).
171. Id.
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less aerial surveillance unconstitutional. Instead, courts devise stan-
dards, such as the common habits of agriculturalists, or employ the
plain view and open fields doctrines, to justify aerial surveillance.
Furthermore, courts encounter difficulty when applying the two-
prong reasonable expectation of privacy test to aerial surveillance.
A subjective expectation of privacy, manifested by posting fences and
"no trespassing" signs, is generally overridden by society's objective
belief that "routine" airflight precludes reasonable privacy expecta-
tions. The courts do not focus on what an individual did to reasonably
expect privacy; rather, close attention is paid to the regularity and
common-place occurrence of aerial flight. Aerial flight, however, can-
not be equated with aerial surveillance. In effect, by stating that
"routine" flights make expectations of privacy in open fields
unreasonable, the government establishes what is and what is not
private. As one author noted: "If the right of privacy is only as great
as the expectation of privacy, then the government can vitiate the
right simply by taking away all such expectations.""2 The Katz prin-
ciple was established to afford greater fourth amendment protection
against new intrusive surveillance techniques. Katz was not meant
to narrow the scope of constitutional protection by allowing the
government to dictate what privacy expectations are reasonable."'
A proper application of Katz to aerial surveillance circumvents
the problem of permitting the government to vitiate privacy expecta-
tions. In People v. Sneed, the court applied Katz and determined that
aerial surveillance of defendant's marijuana garden constituted a
search."7 ' In its determination that Sneed exhibited a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, the court considered whether the premises were
located in an "urban or rural area, whether the area was surrounded
172. Note, supra note 12, at 157.
173. One might speculate whether the proper application of Katz was implemented
in People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1973), because
it justified a criminal conviction, and therefore benefited the side of law enforcement.
A proper application of Katz in aerial surveillance cases benefits an individual engag-
ed in criminal conduct; namely a conviction will not stand because an illegal search
has occurred. Nevertheless, it is important to note that judicial decisions should not
be based on providing effective law enforcement or letting a criminal go free on a
"technicality." The proper focus of fourth amendment protection is at stake-not the
difference between law enforcement and criminal enterprise. Unwarranted search and
seizure violates the fourth amendment. It is not a technicality that is to be overlooked
in an effort to convict criminals.
174. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 541 (1973). Defendant's marijuana plants could not be
seen from any public vantage point on the ground. The police observed the garden
from a helicopter hovering 20 to 25 feet above Sneed's property. Comment, supra note
49, at 453.
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by artificial structures, how high and sight-proof any fencing was, how
close public walkways were to the premises and in what way the police
had gained their view."'75 That Sneed had taken reasonable measures
to shield his property from public view was not the basis for the decis-
ion. The court instead focused its attention on the low altitude level
of the helicopter and its intrusive surveillance of Sneed's marijuana
garden."" Although the court emphasized altitude rather than
manifested privacy expectations, it applied Katz in a more appropriate
manner. The Sneed decision marks an important step toward the
recognition of aerial surveillance as. a search.
The Katz principle is intended to guard against unwarranted
governmental intrusion. If an individual reasonably desires to preserve
something as private, even though the public might have access to
it, his privacy interests are protected by the fourth amendment. The
frequent misapplication of Katz by the courts to aerial surveillance
denies fourth amendment protection despite an individual's reasonable
attempts to maintain privacy. 7 ' The objective standard employed by
the courts precludes fourth amendment protection as it finds expecta-
tions of privacy from routine airflight unreasonable. Nonetheless, aerial
surveillance intrudes upon reasonable expectations of privacy and,
therefore, constitutes a search requiring fourth amendment protec-
tion. A search without a warrant based on probable cause is "per se
unreasonable"'7 8 under the fourth amendment. Although aerial
surveillance is a justifiable law enforcement tool, its unwarranted and
arbitrary use violates the fourth amendment.'
175. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 541 (1973).
176. Id. The court in People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. App. 3d 811, 512 P.2d 1208, 109
Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973), stated people who build swimming pools and sunbathe in their
own backyards expect privacy and immunity from aerial surveillance. Id. The court,
observing that Sneed's garden was also part of his backyard, made the distinction
between backyards and tracts of cultivated land surrounded by forests. The latter
was not immune from overflight surveillance. Id. at 883. The question is where the
line can be drawn when an airplane flies over backyards and tracts of cultivated land.
Since, under Katz, "constitutionally protected areas" no longer exist, the answer is
that no distinction between the areas exist.
177. In most aerial surveillance cases, the defendant files a motion to suppress,
based on the exclusionary rule of evidence, gained from an alleged illegal search. The
defendant is required to prove that his reasonable privacy interests were invaded
by the warrantless aerial surveillance. Often the defendant's motion to suppress is
denied because the courts are unwilling to define aerial surveillance as a search. If
no illegal search occurred, there is no justification for suppressing the evidence. See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). A full discussion of the exclusionary rule and its
accompanying controversy is beyond the scope of this note.
178. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
179. The following three hypotheticals suggest certain appropriate responses
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CONCLUSION
The fourth amendment proscribes unreasonable search and
seizure. Under the Katz principle, fourth amendment protection is bas-
ed on what an individual reasonably expects to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public. In the case of warrantless
aerial surveillance, courts have circumvented the right to have
reasonable privacy expectations protected by misapplying the Katz
principle.
Courts also invoke the plain view and open fields doctrines to
uphold the unregulated use of airplanes as surveillance tools. These
two doctrines, however, are inappropriate justifications for aerial
surveillance under a proper application of Katz. If an individual seeks
to the difficult fourth amendment issues presented by warrantless aerial surveillance:
(a) Officer A is on a routine aerial patrol. Using only his unaid-
ed powers of observation, he sees contraband growing in a
large field. The property holder has made no serious efforts
to shield his contraband from public view.
Result: The open view doctrine should apply. Warrantless aerial surveillance
was proper because the suspect did not show a subjective expectation
of privacy.
(b) Officer A, acting on an informant's tip, put B's farm under
aerial surveillance. A suspects B of growing contraband on
the premises, but he does not obtain a search warrant. After
a brief period of surveillance, A sees, with his unaided vi-
sion, the contraband growing between two rows of corn.
Result: In this case the suspect showed a subjective privacy expectation
by planting the contraband between rows of corn. Officer A may have
had information enough to obtain a search warrant before the aerial
surveillance took place. His observations of B's field were more like a
focused "search" than an inadvertent sighting of something in open view.
In a jurisdiction with a modified probable cause standard, police could
have obtained a search warrant on their reasonable suspicions. In that
case the warrantless intrusion should be deemed unreasonable and the
court should act to protect B's privacy interest.
(c) Officer A, acting on an informant's tip, puts B's property
under aerial surveillance on the suspicion that B is growing
contraband. On the first overflight, A is unable to confirm
the tip. But on a subsequent overflight, A, armed with a high-
powered telescope, is able to see contraband growing under
a canopy.
Result: This warrantless aerial surveillance should be an unconstitutional
search. All three elements-protection of property from public view,
absence of police inadvertance, and the use of sophisticated viewing
devices- militate against a warrantless search and the courts should act
to preserve B's privacy interest.
Schmalz, Recent Developmnents. Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis,
35 VAND. L. REV. 409, 433, n.145 (1982).
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to maintain privacy in his open property, by erecting fences and
posting warning signs, he has reasonably done all he can to protect
his property-either from the ground or by air. While normal airflight
is a fact of modern life, aerial surveillance is not. It is inequitable
to deny fourth amendment protection against warrantless aerial
surveillance because one cannot prevent airflight or surveillance from
an aerial vantage point of open property.
Some courts adopt a strict objective approach toward aerial
surveillance by finding "routine" airflight negates reasonable privacy
expectations. This approach contravenes Katz. It also vitiates the right
to have reasonable privacy expectations by permitting the govern-
ment and law enforcement agencies to determine what privacy in-
terests are to be protected.
The judicial system must balance legitimate law enforcement with
the right to have reasonable privacy interests. Although aerial
surveillance is clearly an effective law enforcement tool, its
unregulated use intrudes upon reasonable privacy interests. Warrant-
less aerial surveillance therefore constitutes a search and must comp-
ly with fourth amendment requirements. To permit warrantless aerial
surveillance serves to encourage rather than inhibit unwarranted
governmental intrusion.
Cynthia L. Horvath
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